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An  integrative  framework  is  proposed  to  advance  management  research  on  technological  platforms,
bridging  two  theoretical  perspectives:  economics,  which  sees  platforms  as double-sided  markets,  and
engineering  design,  which  sees  platforms  as  technological  architectures.  While  the  economic  perspec-
tive  informs  our  understanding  of  platform  competition,  the  engineering  design  perspective  informs  our
view of  platform  innovation.  The  article  argues  that  platforms  can  be  usefully  conceptualized  as  evolving
organizations  or meta-organizations  that: (1) federate  and coordinate  constitutive  agents  who  can  inno-
vate  and  compete;  (2)  create  value  by generating  and  harnessing  economies  of  scope  in  supply  or/and
in  demand;  and  (3)  entail  a modular  technological  architecture  composed  of a  core  and  a  periphery.  Inodularity
conomies of scope
rganizations
support  of this  conceptualization,  a  classiﬁcation  system  is  presented,  indicating  that  technological  plat-
forms appear  in  a variety  of  organizational  forms:  within  ﬁrms,  across  supply  chains,  and  across  industry
innovation  ecosystems.  As  an illustration,  the  framework  is then  applied  to derive  a simple  model  high-
lighting  patterns  of  interaction  between  platform  innovation  and  competition,  yielding  hypotheses  that
could  be tested  empirically  by future  scholars.
©  2014  The  Authors.  Published  by  Elsevier  B.V.  This  is  an open  access  article  under  the  CC  BY  license. Introduction
The digital sector provides several widely recognized examples
f technological platforms and their associated “platform leader”
Gawer and Cusumano, 2002) or “keystone ﬁrm” (Iansiti and Levien,
004), such as Google, Apple, or Facebook. Each of these ﬁrms plays
 central, orchestrating role within a network of ﬁrms and individ-
al innovator–developers that have come to be collectively referred
o as the platform’s “innovation ecosystem” (Adner and Kapoor,
010; Nambisan and Sawhney, 2011) or “ecologies of complex
nnovation” (Dougherty and Dunne, 2011).
Despite the importance of technological platforms, the man-
gement research agenda has been limited and divided. It has
een dominated by two distinct theoretical perspectives: one
nspired from economic theory, and the other from engineering
esign. These perspectives have developed separately, and have
onceptualized platforms either as types of markets (two-sided
arkets, Rochet and Tirole, 2003) or as modular technological
rchitectures (Baldwin and Woodard, 2009). Rooted in different
∗ Tel.: +44 207 594 9174.
E-mail address: a.gawer@imperial.ac.uk
ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2014.03.006
048-7333/© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article u(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).
intellectual traditions, and based on distinct assumptions, these
theories have focused on the different directional forces platforms
respond to. While the economic perspective has yielded insights
on platform competition, the engineering design perspective has
focused on platform innovation.
While useful starting points, these differing perspectives have
not helped articulate how platform competition and platform inno-
vation interact. This is a serious issue, as in reality platforms operate
in ways that often combine innovation with increased competi-
tive tensions within their ecosystems and/or across ecosystems.
For example, in 2012, the social networking platform Facebook
innovated on a new mobile phone “homescreen” application, Face-
book Home, having used Android (Google’s mobile phone operating
system, itself an important technological platform) as a tool to
build it. Facebook then positioned Home to take centre-stage in the
end-user mobile phone experience, thereby expanding Facebook’s
presence in the mobile phone space, thus turning a formerly collab-
orative relationship with Google into a competitive one. In addition,
Facebook has innovated in the domain of social search, where
Google has innovated as well, establishing another space where
these two  ﬁrms will compete even more squarely for end-users’
attention and sources of digital advertising revenues. These exam-
ples indicate that platform innovation and competition cannot be
understood in isolation, and suggest that these forces interact to
shape the evolution of platforms.
nder the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).
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Table 1
Platforms in economics and engineering design.
Literature Economics Engineering design
Conceptualization Platforms as markets Platforms as
technological
architectures
Perspective Demand Supply
Focus Competition Innovation
Value created through Economies of scope in
demand
Economies of scope in
supply and innovation
Role Coordinating device Coordinating device240 A. Gawer / Research P
The important issue of interaction between platform innovation
nd platform competition has recently begun to attract scholars’
ttention. Boudreau (2010) draws on the engineering design litera-
ure to study “open platform strategy and innovation”. Meanwhile,
isenmann et al. (2011) draw on economic analysis to present the
ompetitive analysis of “platform envelopment” in terms of market
ntry and bundling. These studies are attentive to platform inno-
ation as well as competition, nevertheless their differing framings
eﬂect the remaining gap between the theoretical perspectives on
latforms.
This article aims to bridge the dominant theoretical perspec-
ives, and proposes a uniﬁed theoretical framework for research on
echnological platforms. Rather than interpreting platforms either
s types of markets or as speciﬁc technological architectures, the
rgument developed in this paper culminates in a new conceptual-
zation of platforms that sees platforms through an organizational
ens, which combines a speciﬁcation of structure with a focus
n agency, yet does not impose a priori a ﬁxed organizational
orm, recognizing the multiplicity of organizational contexts within
hich platforms can be found.
The paper’s main thesis is that technological platforms can
e usefully conceptualized as evolving organizations or meta-
rganizations1 that: (1) federate and coordinate constitutive agents
ho can innovate and compete; (2) create value by generating and
arnessing economies of scope in supply or/and in demand; and
3) entail a modular technological architecture composed of a core
nd a periphery.
This article offers two main contributions. The ﬁrst contribution
s to bridge the economic double-sided market and the engineering
esign perspectives, by summarizing and comparing systemati-
ally their contributions, arguments, assumptions and limitations.
 demonstrate that there has been an undetected conceptual com-
onality between the two, namely that platforms create value
hrough economies of scope in supply and/or in demand. The
econd contribution is the justiﬁcation and elaboration of the
ew theoretical framework that conceptualizes technological plat-
orms as evolving organizations or meta-organizations composed
f agents who can innovate and compete. Taking on board essen-
ial insights from the previous literatures yet relaxing unnecessary
ssumptions, this framework does not take a platform’s organiza-
ional form as exogenous and ﬁxed, and puts the focus on agents
ithin platforms. These agents can be individuals or ﬁrms, and
an play a variety of roles, these roles not being restricted a priori
o being either always consumers (as in the double-sided market
iterature) or always collaborative innovators (as in the engineer-
ng design literature). By doing so, the framework makes explicit
he micro-foundations of how platforms operate. This framework
onstitutes a useful contribution to the platforms literature, as it
ttempts to lay a theoretical foundation that will allow future scho-
ars to make further incremental and cumulative development to
latform research. In particular, the organizational lens on plat-
orms will allow researchers to tap into the vast organizational
heory literature to develop further insights on how platforms oper-
te and evolve.
The remainder of the article is structured as follows. Section
 summarizes and bridges the economics and engineering design
nd uncovers the centrality of supply and demand economies of
cope in how platforms create value. Section 3 presents a classi-
cation system of three different categories of platforms (within
1 The concept of meta-organization, originally used by Ahrne and Brunsson (2005)
o characterize organizations of organizations, was further clariﬁed by Gulati et al.
2012). In this paper, we adopt Gulati et al. (2012)’s deﬁnition: a meta-organization
s  “an organization whose agents are themselves legally autonomous and not linked
hrough employment relationships” (Gulati et al., 2012, p. 573).among buyers among innovators
Empirical settings ICT Manufacturing and ICT
ﬁrms, across supply chains, and across industry innovation ecosys-
tems), which is then used to develop the justiﬁcation for a new
conceptualization of platforms as organizations and its associated
framework. Section 4 illustrates the framework by proposing a sim-
ple model of how platform innovation and competition interact
along the organizational continuum of technological platforms. The
paper concludes with a discussion of its contributions, limitations
and avenues for further research.
2. Technological platforms: conceptualizations from
economics and engineering design
Management research on technological platforms has been
developed from two separate streams of academic literature:
industrial economics (Rochet and Tirole, 2003; Evans et al., 2006;
Armstrong, 2006) and engineering design (Meyer and Lehnerd,
1997; Krishnan and Gupta, 2001; Jiao et al., 2007). The economics
perspective focuses on how platforms as markets mediate transac-
tions across different customer groups and how network effects
fuel platform competition. In contradistinction, the engineer-
ing design perspective views product platforms as technological
designs that help ﬁrms generate modular product innovation.
Table 1 summarizes and highlights the differences and similari-
ties between the economics and the engineering perspectives on
platforms.
2.1. The economics perspective: platforms as markets
Since the early 2000s, a section of the industrial organization
economics literature has begun to develop theory on platforms,
which have been variously referred to as “two-sided markets”,
“multi-sided markets”, or “multi-sided platforms” (Rochet and
Tirole, 2003, 2006; Evans, 2003; Rysman, 2009). Economists view
platforms as special kinds of markets that play the role of facilita-
tors of exchange between different types of consumers that could
not otherwise transact with each other.
Essential to most economic deﬁnitions of multi-sided platforms
are the existence of “network effects” that arise between the “two
sides” of the market (Evans, 2003; Rochet and Tirole, 2003, 2006;
Armstrong, 2006). For example, Armstrong (2006, p. 66) deﬁnes
two-sided markets as “markets involving two  groups of agents
interacting via ‘platforms’ where one group’s beneﬁt from joining
a platform depends on the size of the other group that joins the
platform”. Evans and Schmalensee (2008, p. 667) deﬁne two-sided
platforms as “businesses in which pricing and other strategies are
strongly affected by the indirect network effects between the two
sides of the platform”.
The concept of network effects is so central in this literature
that Rysman (2009, p. 127) states that “in a technical sense, the
literature on two-sided markets could be seen as a subset of the
literature on network effects.” Most models take network effects
as exogenous and ﬁxed, and see them as the fundamental drivers
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f platform competition. Network effects trigger a self-reinforcing
eedback loop that magniﬁes incumbents’ early advantages. Strong
etwork effects can under certain conditions drive competition
etween platforms to a “winner-take-all” outcome (Eisenmann
t al., 2006).
For an illustration of this self-reinforcing mechanism, consider
he case of video games consoles and its compatible videogames:
 technological platform (for example the Nintendo Wii  game con-
ole) endowed with an initially larger installed base of end-users
gamers) will have the effect of increasing the incentives for deve-
opers of complementary products or services2 (here, video game
evelopers) to join the Wii  platform and develop Wii-compatible
ideogames; this increased provision of complements would, in
urn, help to attract more end-users to the Wii  platform.
The literature distinguishes between two main kinds of network
ffects: direct network effects and indirect network effects. Direct
etwork effects, also called same-side network effects, arise when
he beneﬁt of a technology to a user depends positively on the
umber of other users of this technology, as for example in a tele-
hone network, or the network of Skype users. Indirect network
ffects and the associated notion of cross-group network effects
re precisely deﬁned by Hagiu and Wright (2011, p. 5) as such:
A cross-group network effect arises if the beneﬁt to users in at
east one group (side A) depends on the number of other users in
he other group (side B). An indirect network effect arises if there
re cross-group network effects in both directions (from A to B and
rom B to A) and side B’s participation decision depends on the num-
er of participants on side A so that the beneﬁt to a user on side B
epends (indirectly) on the number of users on side A.” Indirect
etwork effects therefore reﬂect a pre-existing underlying inter-
ependency (and complementarity) between the demands from
wo or more types of consumers. This complementarity in turn
uels a self-reinforcing feedback loop of adoption “from both sides”,
hat has the effect of reinforcing incumbent platform owners’ early
nstalled base advantages.
Network effects are sometimes characterized as demand-side
conomies of scale (Katz and Shapiro, 1986, p. 824; Parker and Van
lstyne, 2005, p. 149). I suggest however, to be more precise, that
hile direct network effects constitute demand-sides economies
f scale, indirect network effects in fact constitute demand-side
conomies of scope, a point I shall return to in more detail in Section
.2.
Platform competition in economics models is driven by the
doption of the platform by multiple consumer constituencies,
tself fuelled by network effects. As the value of the platform stems
rincipally from the access of “one side” to the “other side” of
he platform, the question of platform adoption becomes “how to
ring multiple sides on board” (Evans, 2003; Rochet and Tirole,
006) while avoiding the “chicken-and-egg problem” (Caillaud and
ullien, 2003). Parker and Van Alstyne (2005), Rochet and Tirole
2003, 2006) and most others in this literature suggest that ade-
uate pricing, involving the subsidizing of “one side” of the platform
n order to attract the “other side” to join, solves this coordination
roblem.
The empirical evidence in this literature has generally conﬁrmed
he validity of the economic approach in explaining the difference
n pricing and business models among various platform markets,
rawing from examples generally taken from the ICT industry, the
edia advertising industry, or the payment industry (see for exam-
le Rysman, 2004; Evans et al., 2006; Wilbur, 2008).
2 I shall from now on use the word “complementor” (Brandenburger and Nalebuff,
997) as a short hand (and synonym) for the longer phrase: “developer of comple-
entary products or services”.3 (2014) 1239–1249 1241
In summary, the economic theoretical perspective posits that
platforms fundamentally create value by acting as conduits between
two (or more) categories of consumers who would not have been
able to connect or transact without the platform. Platforms cre-
ate value by coordinating these groups of consumers and in the
economic view this coordination is effected through pricing. The
value that consumers as well as the platform owner can capture
increases with increasing customer bases, in a virtuous cycle of
indirect network effects. These network effects, viewed as an essen-
tial feature of platforms, reﬂect exogenous interdependence of
demand between consumer groups, and shape platform competi-
tion. The economic view helps explain why  some platforms become
dominant, and may  even give rise to “winner-take-all” competitive
outcomes under speciﬁc circumstances.
While quite inﬂuential, the economic perspective on platforms
rests on strong, yet often implicit assumptions, which give rise to
two main limitations. First, in most economic models of two-sided
markets, platforms are taken to be both exogenous and ﬁxed. As
such, these models do not offer much insight into what determines
how or why  they would evolve. Second, the nature of the relation-
ship between the platform owner and the two sides of the platform
is reduced to that of a seller–buyer relationship, where both sides of
the platform, whether they are end-users or innovative developers
of complementary products, are equally seen and treated as simple
consumers.  The developers of complementary products or services
are not seen as suppliers, or as innovators, but as consumers. A deci-
sion by complementors to innovate on top of a platform is viewed
as a consumption choice, an adoption decision.
While this simpliﬁcation may  make sense if one describes
the behaviour of dating bars facilitating the matching between
men  and women (a common motivating example in this litera-
ture), this assumption is problematic for technological platforms,
which are the focus of this article. This reduction of the modal-
ity of interaction between platform complements developers and
platform producers to a passive consumption relationship has sev-
eral limiting consequences for those interested in how platforms
evolve: (a) all forms of competitive interaction between a platform
owner and its own complements developers are left unexamined
(as outside the scope of these models); (b) the very existence
of complementarity-in-demand between the different “consumer
groups” (the foundational “network effects”) is taken for granted,
deemed exogenous, and assumed to be unchanging; (c) the exist-
ence of the platform itself is also taken for granted, exogenous
and unchanging; (d) the impact of platform design on developers’
incentives to innovate is left untreated.
The two-sided markets economic perspective offers therefore a
static, demand-side view of platform competition (as understood
as competition between platforms, not within platform ecosys-
tems). It highlights well conditions under which some platforms
can attain rapidly positions of sustained market dominance, but
by and large does not address the issues of platform evolution and
platform innovation.
While the thrust of the multi-sided literature is summa-
rized above, recent developments in management research have
extended it in directions that begin to challenge its static, demand-
side assumptions. For example, Eisenmann et al. (2009) enrich
the multi-sided view by bringing in concepts from the supply
side, referring to platforms as “multi-sided networks” that have
both “demand-side users” and “supply-side users”. Subsequently,
Eisenmann et al. (2011) begin to address how platform competition
can lead to platforms changing scope over time, in their presen-
tation of “platform envelopment”, a bundling strategy through
which platforms attack their target by extending their function-
alities through leveraging shared user relationships (demand-side
economies of scope) as well as common components (supply-side
economies of scope).
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interface. The abstraction hides the complexity of the element; the
interface indicates how the element interacts with the larger sys-
tem” (Baldwin and Clark, 2000, p. 64). For Baldwin (2008), a physical242 A. Gawer / Research P
.2. The engineering design perspective: platforms as
echnological architectures
Industrial organization theorists were not the ﬁrst to develop
he concept of platforms. More than ten years before Rochet and
irole’s (2003) characterization of platforms as two-sided markets,
he term was percolating through the new product development
iterature, where it soon gave rise to a well-developed theoretical
erspective on platforms and their effect on innovation.
Ideals of rational production and systematic design of complex
ystems, combined with Simon (1962)’s suggestion that hierar-
hical and decomposable systems help mitigate the effects of
omplexity, nourished a set of interrelated literatures on new prod-
ct development, operations and production management, and
ater on modularity, which I regroup under the label of engineer-
ng design perspective. These literatures have attempted to explore
he implications of so-called “design hierarchy” (Clark, 1985) on
ethods of product development and production. It developed the
oncept of product platforms, and highlighted speciﬁc kinds of
esign choices on product architecture (Ulrich, 1995) that could
elp ﬁrms generate product families (Sanderson and Uzumeri,
995) and innovate more quickly and systematically by using and
e-using common assets (Krishnan and Gupta, 2001) as templates
or product innovation.
For Wheelwright and Clark (1992, p. 73), the earliest man-
gement scholars to refer explicitly to the concept of platform,
latforms are products that meet the needs of a core group of cus-
omers, but can be modiﬁed through the addition, substitution, or
emoval of features. For McGrath (1995), platforms are collections
f common elements, especially technological ones, implemented
cross a range of products. Meyer and Lehnerd (1997) deﬁne a
latform as a set of subsystems and interfaces forming a com-
on  structure from which a stream of products can be developed.
rishnan and Gupta (2001) deﬁne platforms simply as component
nd subsystem assets shared across a family of products, while
uffato and Roveda (2002) add the perspective of an intention-
lly planned and developed set of subsystems and interfaces from
hich products can be developed. Robertson and Ulrich (1998)
ropose a broader deﬁnition: the assets (components, processes,
nowledge, people, or relationships) shared by a set of products.
These platform deﬁnitions all share the commonality of sys-
ematic re-use of components across different products within a
roduct family, which allows economies of scope in production to
ccur. Hence, the systematic creation and harnessing of economies
f scope in innovation can be seen as one fundamental principle of
latform-based new product development.
“Economies of scope” (Panzar and Willig, 1975, 1981; Teece,
980, 1982) exist when the cost of joint production is less than
he cost of producing each output separately. For the context of
latform-based new product development, I propose to extend
he concept of economies of scope in production to the concept
f economies of scope in innovation. I deﬁne economies of scope
n innovation as when the cost of jointly innovating on Product A
nd B is lower than the cost of innovating on A independently of
nnovating on B.3
Empirical studies within the engineering design stream have
dentiﬁed such economies of scope can occur in a variety of indus-
rial contexts (such as automotive manufacturing, aerospace engine
anufacturing, consumer electronics), and a variety of organiza-
ional settings. For example, while early studies of manufacturing
3 While further development of this concept is outside the scope of this article,
 similar concept is found in Bresnahan and Trajtenberg (1995)’s study of general
urpose technologies when they formalize what they call “innovation complemen-
arity”.3 (2014) 1239–1249
platforms observed them within ﬁrms, research has also docu-
mented how manufacturing platforms were increasingly being
shared across ﬁrms within supply-chains (Brusoni, 2005; Zirpoli
and Becker, 2011; Zirpoli and Caputo, 2002; Brusoni and Prencipe,
2009; Sturgeon, 2002; Doran, 2003; Huang et al., 2005; MacDufﬁe,
2013; MacDufﬁe and Helper, 2006; Sako, 2009; Simpson et al.,
2006; Tatsumoto et al., 2009). Most recently, technological plat-
forms have been found to operate within even larger networks
of ﬁrms that are not necessarily linked through buyer–supplier
relationships – also known as “innovation ecosystems” (Adner
and Kapoor, 2010; Nambisan and Sawhney, 2011) or “ecologies of
complex innovation” (Dougherty and Dunne, 2011). Such indus-
try platforms are then deﬁned as ‘. . .a  building block, providing an
essential function to a technological system – which acts as a foun-
dation upon which other ﬁrms, loosely organized in an innovation
ecosystem, can develop complementary products, technologies or
services’ (Gawer, 2009a: 2; Gawer, 2009b: 54).
Platform design stands out as a common element across this set
of organizational contexts (Huang et al., 2005; Simpson et al., 2006;
Jiao et al., 2007). Gawer (2009c) and Baldwin and Woodard (2009)
highlight that all observed platforms share a structural common-
ality: that of a modular technological architecture (Ulrich, 1995;
Baldwin and Clark, 2000).4 Baldwin and Woodard (2009) present
the most advanced attempt to characterize what is unique about
platforms architectures: they view platforms as having a particular
type of technological architecture that is not only modular but also
structured around a core and a periphery. In this view, “a platform
architecture partitions a system into stable core components and
variable peripheral components”; the platform itself is constituted
by the stable core of the product system (emphasis added) (Baldwin
and Woodard, 2009, p. 24).
Facilitating innovation is therefore what platforms, as mod-
ular systems, are particularly good for. The central tenet of the
modularity literature is precisely that modular product architec-
tures facilitate innovation (Langlois and Robertson, 1992; Baldwin
and Clark, 2000; Schilling, 2000). This is because, ﬁrst, modularity
helps manage complexity: by breaking up a complex system into
discrete components, which interact through standardized inter-
faces within a standardized architecture, one can eliminate what
would otherwise be an unmanageable spaghetti tangle of systemic
interconnections (Simon, 1962; Parnas, 1972; Langlois, 2002). The
second and related reason is that modularity, by reducing the inter-
dependencies between modules to simple interconnectivity rules,
reduces the scope of information that designers need to design
their modules, and allows a specialization and division of innova-
tive labour. This facilitates autonomous innovation within modules,
as well as mix-and-match innovation through innovative recombi-
nation of modules (Garud and Kumaraswamy, 1995).
The role of “interfaces” is therefore fundamental to how modu-
larity facilitates innovation. A modular architecture divides all the
information required to build the system into visible and hidden
information. For Baldwin and Clark, “when the complexity of one
of the elements crosses a certain threshold, that complexity can
be isolated by deﬁning a separate abstraction that has a simple4 Ulrich (1995) deﬁnes product architecture as “the scheme by which the function
of  a product is allocated to physical components” (Ulrich, 1995, p. 419), and more
precisely as: (1) the arrangement of functional elements; (2) the mapping from
functional elements to physical components; (3) the speciﬁcation of the interfaces
among interacting physical components (Ulrich, 1995, p. 422). For Baldwin and Clark
(2000, p. 63), “An architecture speciﬁes what modules will be part of the system and
what their functions will be”; while “interfaces” describe in detail how modules will
interact, including how they ﬁt together and communicate.
olicy 4
i
m
e
d
i
i
h
2
i
a
t
c
t
l
(
t
o
k
t
p
f
a
p
v
s
f
e
o
b
h
a
t
b
f
f
a
r
e
f
e
h
b
“
c
ﬁ
3
3
p
d
2
c
t
i
e
a
t
5 An application programming interface (API) is deﬁned by the Software Engi-
neering Institute as “a technology that facilitates exchanging messages or data
between two or more different software applications.” (“Application Programming
Interfaces,” vol. 2004: Software Engineering Institute – Carnegie Mellon University,A. Gawer / Research P
nterface between modules becomes the physical embodiment, or
aterial instantiation, of the division of labour between differ-
nt teams. The interface is therefore a divider (of labour between
istinct teams), but also a connector, and a conduit of selected
nformation facilitating interconnection.
The degree of “openness” of interfaces will therefore have an
nﬂuence on the extent to which this facilitation of innovation can
appen. The concept of open interfaces can be a fuzzy one (West,
007) but I take it here in the commonly understood sense of the
nterface contains information that is accessible to external agents
nd usable by them to allow to build complementary innovation
hat is compatible with this interface. While modular innovation
an happen within a ﬁrm if all relevant information is shared within
he ﬁrm members, innovation can also be facilitated at the industry
evel, depending on how open the interfaces between modules are
Langlois and Robertson, 1992).
In the context of platforms, opening a system to complemen-
ary development affects innovation by drawing on a wider set
f accessible external capabilities and distributed heterogeneous
nowledge (Chesbrough, 2003), as well as independent experimen-
ation.
In summary, the engineering view interprets platforms as
urposefully designed technological architectures (including inter-
aces) that facilitate innovation. This view says that the design
nd use of platforms helps ﬁrms achieve economies of scope in
roduction and design – allowing for economies of scope in inno-
ation. While it is extremely useful to understand how platforms
timulate innovation, the engineering design perspective on plat-
orms has several important limitations. This perspective sees
ssentially platforms as structurally stable: innovation happens
n modules, within stable system architectures, and facilitated
y stable interfaces; this view therefore does not help explain
ow platforms themselves evolve (that is, how what Baldwin
nd Woodard (2009) would call the “core”, evolves). In addition,
his stream of research does not provide insights on competition
etween platforms (which the economics literature does), and it
ails to take into account the possible competition between plat-
orm owners and complementors (which the economics literature
lso ignores).
While the thrust of the engineering design literature is summa-
ized above, recent developments in management research have
xtended it in directions that attempt to articulate how plat-
orm innovation and platform competition interact over time. For
xample Boudreau (2010) presents an empirical study of mobile
andheld platforms, and ﬁnds an inverted U-shape relationship
etween innovation and opening platform access, consistent with a
crowding out” of innovation incentives when competition among
omplementors increase beyond a certain level, a hypothesis con-
rmed in Boudreau (2012).
. Toward an integrative framework for platforms
.1. Motivation
The reality of platform dynamics, and in particular of how com-
etition and innovation interact, is more complex than the one
rawn by Boudreau (2010, 2012) and Eisenmann et al. (2009,
011). They analyze competition between platforms as well as
ompetition between complementors. However, neither addresses
he question of competition between the platform owner and
ts complementors, which frequently occurs in platform-based
cosystems.
Consider for example the shifting relationship between Google
nd Apple, and between Facebook and Google, in the mobile sec-
or. Apple used to bundle Google Maps as a part of the iPhone3 (2014) 1239–1249 1243
homescreen, but the iPhone5 replaced it with its own Apple maps
application. Facebook has used Google’s Android’ APIs5 to develop
its mobile phone “homescreen” application, thus shifting from
being a complementor to competing directly with Google for end-
users’ attention and advertising revenues. Earlier examples include
the shifting relationship between Netscape and Microsoft in the
late 1990s: Netscape started as a complementor to Windows, but
its success caused Microsoft to treat it as a competitor, triggering
the “envelopment” of the browser with the introduction Internet
Explorer.
The opposite dynamic can also occur, when competitors ally
to create a common platform. In the late 1990s, Symbian rallied a
coalition of competing mobile handset manufacturers (Nokia, Erics-
son, Motorola, Siemens), in order to attempt to create a smartphone
operating system which would forestall Microsoft’s entry into the
mobile market.
In addition, the ﬁxed roles imposed on agents by the previ-
ous literatures restricted them to either being consumers (per the
double-sided market literature) or collaborative innovators (per
the engineering design literature). These do not reﬂect common
empirical patterns of how a number of platforms operate and
evolve, since in today’s digital economy users often play both roles
in non-separable ways.
Consider for example the case of important contemporary
digital platforms such as Google or Facebook. While end-users
“consume” the service (search, social networking) offered by these
platforms, they also constantly “feed”, individually and collec-
tively, their personal data into these platforms (as expressed by
the items they search, their location, their preferences as revealed
by previous queries, and their personal connections data), thereby
providing the very data upon which these platforms draw upon
to deliver its services. Users play therefore the role of (generally
unpaid) contributors to the supply of (and further innovation on)
the platform itself.
Agents’ changing roles within platform-based ecosystems (from
complementor to competitor for example, or vice versa) and asso-
ciated shifting patterns of collaboration and competition, are in
fact a feature of ecosystems (Iansiti and Levien, 2004), one that
ought to be treated explicitly in rigorous attempts to theorize
technological platforms. This is particularly relevant for digital
platforms, as Baldwin and von Hippel (2011) suggest that the
transition to increasingly digitized and modularized design and
production practices, coupled with the availability of very-low-
cost, Internet-based communication, is creating a “paradigm shift”
whereby innovation is not restricted to producers anymore, but
that users are increasingly able and willing to engage in distributed
and collaborative innovation.
We therefore need a theoretically sound, integrated conceptu-
alization of platforms that allows multi-modal interaction between
agents within and across platforms, and that would allow scholars
to study the ways in which competition and innovation shape the
way platforms evolve. In the next section I develop such a concep-
tualization, and argue for the value of analyzing platforms through
an organizational lens.2003). In other words, an API refers to a software interface that deﬁnes the service
that  one component, module, or application provides to others software elements.
Generally invisible to end-users, APIs are carefully thought out pieces of code cre-
ated by programmers for their applications that allow other applications to interact
with their application.
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Table 2
A classiﬁcation of technological platforms.
Internal platform Supply-chain platform Industry platform
Level of analysis • Firm • Supply-chain • Industry ecosystems
Platform’s constitutive
agents
• One ﬁrm • Assembler • Platform leader
•  Its constituent sub-units • Suppliers • Complementors
Technological
architecture
• Modular design
• Core and periphery
Interfaces • Closed interfaces • Interfaces selectively open • Open interfaces
Interfaces speciﬁcations are
shared within the ﬁrm, but not
disclosed externally
Interface speciﬁcations are shared
exclusively across the supply-chain
Interface speciﬁcations are shared
with complementors
Accessible innovative
capabilities
• Firm capabilities • Supply-chain’s capabilities • Potentially unlimited pool of external capabilities
Coordination
mechanisms
•  Authority through
managerial hierarchy
• Contractual relations between supply-chain
member organizations
• Ecosystem governance
◦ In the special case of multi-sided
markets: exclusively through pricing
Literature •  Sanderson and Uzumeri (1995) • Brusoni (2005) • Gawer and Cusumano (2002)
• Meyer and Lehnerd (1997) • Zirpoli and Becker (2011) • Baldwin and Woodard (2009)
• Simpson (2004) • Sako (2009) • Boudreau (2010)
• Eisenmann et al. (2011)
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.2. Parameters of the framework
In the previous section I established that, underlying their
bvious differences, the economics and the engineering design per-
pectives share a common important conceptual underpinning: in
rder to create value, platforms rely crucially on economies of scope
n supply and innovation (for the engineering design view), and
conomies of scope in demand (for the economics view). Given the
entrality of economies of scope in theories of organizations (Teece,
980; Wernerfelt, 1984; Helfat and Eisenhardt, 2004), this com-
on  underpinning provides the intuition that an organizational
ens might be useful to develop a unifying framework for platforms.
y organization I do not necessarily mean one ﬁrm or one legal
ntity, nor one type of organizational form but rather, returning to
 fundamental deﬁnition of what organizations are (Barnard, 1938,
. 73), a “system of coordinating activities of two or more persons”,
ithout any a priori as to the organizational form it might take.
A key conceptual barrier to bridging current perspectives on
latforms may  lie in their respective ﬁxed assumptions about the
rganizational form that platforms take. In order to develop a uni-
ed framework I allow the organizational form to be an endogenous
ariable.
In addition, we have seen that in today’s digital economy, users
ften play both roles (consumer, innovator) in non-separable ways.
o develop a versatile yet uniﬁed framework for technological plat-
orms, it might therefore be useful to refrain from pre-determining
 priori whether the agents who constitute it play the role of “sup-
ly” or “demand”. Let us therefore allow multi-modal interaction
nd possibly evolving interaction between platforms’ constitutive
gents.
A uniﬁed framework for platforms should therefore not impose
 priori the organizational context within which they occur,
hether within ﬁrms or across markets. It would present platforms
n the diverse ways in which as they appear in reality, in differ-
nt organizational contexts and at different levels of analysis, and
ighlight their essential characteristics. It should also allow multi-
odal interaction between platform agents, either within or across
latforms.
In order to further develop this framework, I present a classiﬁca-
ion system based on an analysis of the various platform literaturestomotive manufacturing) • Facebook (social networking)
anufacturing) • Google (Internet search and advertising)
•  Apple iPhone and Apps (Mobile)
and associated key examples (Table 2). Table 2 classiﬁes plat-
forms within three increasingly broader organizational settings:
within ﬁrms, across supply-chains, and within ecosystems. Each
of the three organizational settings has a corresponding type of
platform, for which I have highlighted: the level of analysis; the
platform’s constitutive agents; its technological architecture; the
nature of its interfaces; its innovative capabilities; and its coordi-
nation mechanisms. In addition, a representative set of relevant
empirical examples has been included, along with key research
articles.
Table 2 highlights the following results.
First, the phenomenon of platforms is observable at different
levels of analysis and in various organizational settings: within
ﬁrms, across supply-chains, and across industry ecosystems.
Second, depending on the organizational setting, the constitu-
tive agents of the platform are: a ﬁrm and its sub-units (in internal
platforms); or an assembler and its suppliers (in supply-chain plat-
forms); or, a platform leader and its complementors (in industry
platforms).
Third, all platforms share a common modular architecture orga-
nized around a core and a periphery. This is a conﬁrmation of
Baldwin and Woodard (2009) intuition. This common technological
architecture constitutes therefore a constant throughout all kinds
of platforms, and cuts across all organizational forms.
Fourth, all platforms have technological interfaces (between the
“core” and the “periphery”) and, depending on whether they are
within ﬁrms, within supply-chains, or within ecosystems, these
interfaces are closed, semi-closed, or open. As explained earlier
(and as in West, 2007), the concept of open interface is never black
and white, and even within ecosystems, there are variations within
the spectrum of how open these interfaces are. For example, Apple’s
iPhone ecosystem has been described as a “walled garden” (Hazlett
et al., 2011), while Google Android’s operating system has been
seen as “more open”, and open source software has been seen as a
purely open ecosystem. But generally as one moves from internal
platforms (within ﬁrms) to industry platforms (within ecosystems),
interfaces become more open.
Fifth, as the scope of the platform broadens from internal
platform through supply-chain platform and on to industry plat-
form, the platform’s access to innovating agents and their diverse
olicy 4
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apabilities increases. While for ﬁrm-level platforms the sources of
nnovation are restricted to within the focal ﬁrm, and for supply-
hain platforms within the focal ﬁrm’s pool of suppliers, within
cosystems, innovators could be anyone, and may  be found any-
here. The platform owner may  not know ex-ante who  or where
nnovators may  be. In fact, an interesting speciﬁcity of industry
latforms is that an industry platform owner does not need to
now ex-ante who a complementary innovator might be. Potential
nnovators of complementary products self-identify to the plat-
orm owner, and can utilize the codiﬁed information on platform
onnectors (such as APIs) and programming tools that are disclosed
y platform owners to build compatible complements. Industry
latforms therefore reduce the platform owner’s search cost for
omplementary innovators and extend the pool of accessible inno-
ative capabilities that will indirectly create value for the platform.
Sixth, the coordination mechanisms operating within internal
latforms are those of the managerial hierarchy, those operating
cross supply-chains are buyers–suppliers contracts, and within
cosystems the coordination is ensured by ecosystem governance,
 point which I shall return to later.
The resulting classiﬁcation system supports a uniﬁed view of
latforms in that it highlights that the different types of platforms
escribed in the different platform literatures, far from ascribing
o fundamentally different phenomena, constitute in fact various
anifestations of an underlying similar phenomenon.
The previous analysis supports therefore a uniﬁed conceptu-
lization of platforms as organizations, as follows: Technological
latforms can be usefully seen as evolving organizations or meta-
rganizations that: (1) federate and coordinate constitutive agents
ho can innovate and compete; (2) create value by generating and
arnessing economies of scope in supply or/and in demand; and (3)
ntail a technological architecture that is modular and composed
f a core and a periphery.
The reason the new conceptualization speciﬁes that the
latform federates and coordinates (as opposed to simply “coordi-
ates”) its agents is because it recognizes that neither the existence
or the process of federation of complementors into a collective can
e taken for granted, especially in the context of industry ecosys-
ems. While within ﬁrms, and to some extent within supply-chains,
he commonality of objectives among constitutive agents could
erhaps be taken for granted, the federation of innovative and
utonomous agents can certainly not be taken for granted within
nnovative ecosystems. Absent managerial hierarchy or supply-
hain authority, an important role for platforms within industry
cosystems is precisely to ensure federation so that coordina-
ion amongst agents can happen. Federation cannot be taken for
ranted, and, without federation and without contracts, there is no
asis for coordination. Hence, the importance of ecosystem gover-
ance (Tiwana et al., 2010) for building and sustaining legitimacy
f the platform leader (Gawer and Henderson, 2007) as well as for
ostering a collective identity for ecosystem members (Gawer and
hillips, 2013).
This conceptualization is theoretically consistent with both the
conomic perspective and the engineering view perspective. It is
onsistent with the engineering design perspective in that the
ondition of modular architecture and the core-periphery struc-
ure are maintained throughout all categories of platforms. With
egard to the economic perspective, this conceptualization con-
iders the perspective of platforms as double-sided markets as an
mportant special case of industry platforms, one in which the rela-
ionships between the platform’s constitutive agents are purely
ransactional, and where the pricing mechanism is the principal
ode of coordination among platform agents.
While it builds on the previous literatures, my  proposed
onceptualization of platforms as evolving organizations or meta-
rganizations relaxes their most problematic assumptions: in3 (2014) 1239–1249 1245
contrast with the economics view, the proposed conceptualization
does not assumes that the constitutive agents of the platform play
a ﬁxed role (that of a buyer); and in contrast with the engineering
view, it does not assume that they necessarily play the ﬁxed role of
a complementor – nor does it assume that the platform interfaces
are stable. I propose instead that the conceptualization of platform
acknowledges that the roles played by the platform’s constitu-
tive agents can evolve over time. Without autonomous agents and
ecosystem governance, an industry platform is just a technological
architecture, an agent-less structure.
By conceptualizing platforms as organizations, I re-introduce
agency in the concept of platforms, which had disappeared in the
engineering view of platforms, while not discarding the important
structural characteristic of their architecture (core-periphery). By
bringing to the fore the platform’s constitutive agents and allowing
them a multiplicity of modes of interaction that are theoretically
and empirically consistent with how platforms create value, the
framework takes one step towards uncovering micro-foundations
of how platforms operate and evolve.
4. Platform innovation and competition
As an illustration of how to use the framework detailed above,
I now infer from it a simple model of patterns of innovation and
competition that can be associated with technological platforms,
and which could be tested by other scholars.
4.1. Patterns of platform innovation and competition
The framework has highlighted that for each type of platform
(internal, supply-chain, industry platform) there is a corresponding
coherent set of attributes (organizational form, interfaces, set of
accessible capabilities, governance). Rather than representing them
as a discrete set of rigidly delineated conﬁgurations of attributes,
one can represent them as inscribed in a continuum (Fig. 1).
Fig. 1 aims to represent the organizational continuum of tech-
nological platforms, where for each degree of interface openness,
there is a corresponding organizational form, a set of accessible
capabilities, and a corresponding type of governance. By calling it a
continuum and designing a visual representation of a set of parallel
arrows, I aim to convey the intuition that there is a kind of ﬂuidity,
and possible evolutionary pathways, between these conﬁgurations.
To illustrate how internal platforms can evolve towards industry
platforms, consider the case of the historical evolution from com-
puter mainframes to personal computers spanning three decades.
In the mid-1960s, IBM, the industry leader in mainframes, engag-
ing in a radical redesign of mainframe computer, created with the
IBM System/360 an internal modular platform for future families of
IBM mainframes (Fisher et al., 1983). At that time, the speciﬁcation
IBM System/360 interfaces were closed, and only known to IBM
engineers. But the modular architecture of System/360 offered the
technical possibility for other ﬁrms to create modules that would
“slot in” on “plug-in” to the architecture. Soon after the introduction
of System/360, a large number of companies poached key IBM engi-
neers and started to offer “plug-compatible” peripherals including
disk drives, terminals, printers, and memory devices (Baldwin and
Clark, 2000). So, in the 1970s and early 1980s, the IBM System/360
gave rise to “plug-compatible” products within a supply chain.
When IBM decided to enter the new micro-computer category with
the IBM PC in the early 1980s, it built it with off-the shelf parts from
the new supply chain, for example from Intel and Microsoft.In the mid  to late 1980s, a number of ﬁrms began commercializ-
ing copies of the IBM PC, and an ecosystem of ﬁrms grew outside of
IBM’s supply chain. Pushing their advantage, Intel and Microsoft
recognized that they could further weaken IBM by steering the
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directly with Google for end-users’ attention and advertising rev-
enues on mobile. Consider also how, in 2013, internet on-demandFig. 1. The organizational con
evelopment of the PC architecture towards Intel’s microproces-
ors and Microsoft’s operating system. As IBM gradually lost control
ver its supply chain, the supply-chain platform evolved into an
ndustry platform in the 1990s, with Intel and Microsoft seizing
latform leadership (Gawer and Cusumano, 2002). In particular,
ntel innovated on the architecture of the overall PC system by
reating open interfaces allowing faster interconnections between
lements of the PC, and freely shared the intellectual property of
ts interfaces. Intel’s process of orchestrating industry-wide com-
lementary innovation in a way that protected complementors’
ncentives helped establish the continued support of an ecosystem
f ﬁrms whose business models were tied to the new, open ‘Wintel’
Windows + Intel) PC architecture, which had by then become the
ndustry platform (Gawer and Phillips, 2013).
One can use the framework to unpack how innovation and com-
etition interact along the organizational continuum described in
ig. 1. Design decisions on technological interfaces, as well as gov-
rnance decisions, can be expected to have an effect on the platform
gents’ incentives to collaborate, to innovate, and/or to compete.
As the platform scope broadens from internal to supply-chain
o industry platform, access to innovating agents and their diverse
apabilities increases. This implies that the potential for collab-
rative innovation is increased as one moves (ﬁguratively) from
nternal to supply-chain to industry platforms.
But at the same time, as one moves from internal to supply-chain
o ecosystem platforms, the likelihood of competition between con-
titutive agents of the platform is also likely to increase. This is
ecause within ﬁrms, while competition between teams is theo-
etically curtailed by the managerial hierarchy and within supply
hains, competition between the platform owner and its suppliers
s also kept in check through appropriate contracts that maintain
ncentives for cooperation. Within ecosystems however, agents
re autonomous, and cooperation between platform owner and
omplementors cannot be taken for granted. Ecosystems’ loose,
nstructured relationships offer neither contractual safeguards
gainst opportunistic or competitive behaviour, nor high-powered
ncentives for cooperation. In addition, as Pil and Cohen (2006) and
thiraj et al. (2008) have established, while modularization enablesm of technological platforms.
performance gains through innovation, at the same time, it also
sets the stage for those gains to be eroded through competition
and imitation. It is therefore to be expected that competition will
occur among platform owners and complementors within industry
ecosystems. From this I infer the following hypotheses:
H1. As platform interfaces become more open, more agents will
be attracted into the platform ecosystem, and the platform leader
will be able to access a larger set of potentially complementary
innovative capabilities.
As an illustration, consider how Google, Twitter, Flickr, Amazon,
and Facebook have developed and shared Application Pro-
gramming Interfaces (APIs) to encourage independent software
developers to utilize these platforms’ web  services and incorporate
them within their own  platform-complementary innovations. For
example, as of February 2014, Google had published 51 APIs,6 for
almost all of Google’s popular consumer products such as Google
Maps, YouTube, Google Search, and many others. These APIs are a
key resource for the digital platforms’ ecosystem developers, allow-
ing them to access the platform user data and build applications.
They are also a key resource for platform owners who then have
access to external developers and derive value from their platform-
complementary innovations.
H2. While a large proportion of the platform ecosystem’s agents
will innovate in ways that are complementary to the platform, a
number of them will start innovating in ways that become com-
petitive to the platform.
As an illustration, consider how Facebook launched in 2013 its
mobile phone “homescreen” application, Facebook Home, which it
had developed using Google’s Android, thus shifting from being
a complementor in Google’s Android ecosystem to competingvideo streaming service provider Netﬂix started to develop its own
6 Source: https://developers.google.com/apis-explorer/#p/ (accessed 20.02.14).
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igh-quality original programming content, thereby competing
ith traditional content providers such as television network HBO
n relation to whom it was until then acting as a complementor.7
3. Emergence of competition from complementors will depend
n the governance of the ecosystem, as collaborative governance
ill increase complementors’ incentives to innovate in platform-
nhancing ways.
In well-governed ecosystems, the platform leader will seek to
reserve the alignment of interests of ecosystem members, and
ill take care to protect complementors’ margins. Intel for example
ook particular care to ensure that its complementors could remain
roﬁtable by refraining to compete directly with them in a number
f markets (Gawer and Henderson, 2007). Conversely, Microsoft’s
olicy of “embrace and extend” towards Netscape and Java in the
id  1990s, was allegedly used to weaken and dislodge complemen-
ors who were perceived as competitive threats; Microsoft argued
n its defence that this was demand-driven.
4. Emergence of competition from former complementors is
n turn likely to create a reaction by the platform leader to start
ompeting back with these former complementors-turned-rivals,
ither by enveloping them, or by closing its technological interface,
n effect moving away from being an industry platform towards
ecoming a supply-chain platform.
As an illustration, consider how Twitter changed the rules of
ts API and restricted its use in 2012, henceforth preventing users’
weets from appearing on the rival social networking platform
inkedIn (which had hitherto been treated as a complementor), as
n attempt to stop fuelling the growth of LinkedIn with Twitter con-
ent, and to corral users back onto its own site where their attention
ould be monetized through advertising sales.8 Another example is
hen Apple stopped offering Google Maps as pre-installed appli-
ation on its new iPhone iOS6 in 2012, following up on Google’s
efusal to provide turn-by-turn navigation for maps on the iPhone
 a valuable feature that was available on Google’s own  Android
perating system for smartphones.9
7 Source: “Punching above its weight, upstart Netﬂix pokes at HBO”, The New
ork Times, 16 Feb., 2014
8 Source: http://linkedinproﬁleservice.co/linkedin-proﬁle/linkedin-proﬁles/
witter-stops-no-longer-displays-tweets-on-linkedin-proﬁles/ (accessed 20.02.14).
9 Source: http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/nov/11/apple-maps-
oogle-iphone-users.3 (2014) 1239–1249 1247
Fig. 2 summarizes these hypotheses.
This small set of hypotheses, logically derived from the frame-
work and consistent with anecdotal evidence, indicate one of the
possible pathways through which platforms may  evolve. They
obviously require empirical testing, preferably in a variety of empir-
ical settings. Such empirical testing is outside the scope of this
article and would constitute a fruitful avenue for further research.
5. Discussion and conclusion
5.1. Discussion
This paper makes two  main contributions: to have summarized
and bridged the two  prevailing conceptualizations of technological
platforms, and to have developed a new theoretical framework for
platforms, culminating in a new conceptualization of platforms as
evolving organizations or meta-organizations. Building on a classi-
ﬁcation system of different kinds of platforms, I have proposed that
platforms operate along an organizational continuum, including
ﬁrms, supply chains, and industry ecosystems. I have then derived
hypotheses about patterns of platform innovation and competition.
Conceptualizing platforms as evolving organizations or meta-
organizations possesses distinct advantages. It is consistent with
existing theories from economics and engineering design, and
while it has built on the previous literatures, it has relaxed their
most problematic assumptions: it does not require us to assume
that the constitutive agents of the platform play a ﬁxed role, be that
buyer or a complementor – nor does it assume that the platform
interfaces are stable. Instead this conceptualization acknowledges
that the roles played by the platform’s constitutive agents can be
multiple and evolve over time. Also, conceptualizing platforms as
organizations or meta-organizations re-introduces agency in the
concept of platforms, which had disappeared in the engineering
view of platforms, without discarding the important structural
characteristic of their architecture (core-periphery). By focusing
on agents’ behaviour and structural characteristics, the framework
makes explicit the micro-foundations of how platforms operate,
and begins to provide a uniﬁed theoretical foundation to help ana-
lyze innovation and competition within and across platforms.
5.2. Managerial implications
Platform leaders within ecosystems face the important and
difﬁcult task of attracting and incentivizing a potentially limit-
less number of innovative yet autonomous agents to act in ways
that are platform-enhancing, as opposed to platform-indifferent
or even possibly platform-competing. As such, platform leaders
are required to nurture their ecosystems and cannot resort to
the traditional modes of governance available within ﬁrms or
supply-chains, namely managerial hierarchy or suppliers–buyers
contracts. Ecosystem governance is therefore essential to platforms
competitive and innovative performance.
This implication is consistent with previous research by Gawer
and Cusumano (2002, 2008), Cusumano (2010), Boudreau and
Hagiu (2009), and Tiwana et al. (2010), who have explored
the effectiveness of combinations of managerial choices leading
ﬁrms to obtain and sustain positions as platform leaders. Future
practice-relevant research could also develop further managerial
implications that might beneﬁt ﬁrms that aim to dethrone estab-
lished platforms (Suarez and Kirtley, 2012).
5.3. Limitations and avenues for further researchThe proposed framework constitutes one step in the direction
of strengthening the theoretical foundations for research on plat-
forms, and has obvious limitations. First, it is a theory-building
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ffort that requires future systematic empirical validation. Fur-
her, it only begins to explore the complex patterns of interaction
etween innovation and competition within and across platforms,
nd does not provide answers to a number of important questions.
or example, how do decisions about platform scope (such as envel-
pment) and degree of platform openness interact? Also, what are
he drivers and consequences of changes in the degree of openness
f platforms as they evolve over time? In addition, the concept of
conomies of scope in innovation was discussed only brieﬂy here,
nd requires further theoretical elaboration.
Promisingly however, the organizational lens proposed by this
ew framework allows future researchers to tap into the vast orga-
izational theory literature, and in particular on organizational
volution, to illuminate poorly understood aspects of platform
ynamics. This opens up an important set of avenues for future
esearch.
For example, scholars could use the framework developed here
o develop hypotheses on how platforms set out their boundaries,
y following the same logic that organizations use to set out their
rganizational boundaries – a process that can be interpreted dif-
erently depending on the theoretical conception of organizations
hat one adopts. One fruitful avenue might be for example to build
n Santos and Eisenhardt (2005)’s comprehensive theory on orga-
izational boundaries, and apply it to platforms.
Another promising avenue for further research, building on a
ifferent branch of organizational theory, would be to connect the
iterature on platforms to the literature on inter-organizational net-
ork dynamics (Powell et al., 1996, 2005; Uzzi, 1997; Ahuja, 2000;
rass et al., 2004; Dhanaraj and Parkhe, 2006; Zaheer et al., 2000) to
erive insights on patterns of emergence and evolution of platform
cosystems as networks of innovators. Given the growing impor-
ance of technological platforms, the development of a more precise
nd nuanced understanding of platform emergence and evolution
romises to be a fertile area of further study.
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